01
Lovable
Have the latest Lovable Basic and Deep scan findings been reviewed and resolved or explicitly accepted?
Lovable’s scanners cover configuration, database, dependencies, and code patterns, but findings still require judgment.
Free Lovable security checklist
Catch the security gaps a working demo cannot show you.
Review 12 high-value security boundaries for a Lovable app and get a risk-ordered action list without connecting a repository or database.
✓ No repository access✓ No secrets requested✓ Risk-ordered result
0 of 12 answered
02
DatabaseLaunch blocker
Is RLS enabled with operation-specific policies on every table exposed through the API?
Tables created through raw SQL require particular attention.
03
DatabaseLaunch blocker
Have two synthetic users proven that cross-user access fails?
Policy text alone does not prove runtime behavior.
04
AuthorizationLaunch blocker
Are admin and paid features enforced server-side rather than only hidden in the UI?
Client-side state and hidden buttons can be modified by a user.
05
SecretsLaunch blocker
Are private keys absent from browser bundles, responses, logs, prompts, and repository history?
Anything delivered to the browser should be treated as public.
06
SecretsLaunch blocker
Is every service-role or RLS-bypass credential restricted to trusted server-side code?
Supabase service credentials can bypass row-level policies.
07
Storage
Do file rules enforce owner, type, size, path, download, and deletion boundaries?
A private table does not automatically make a storage bucket private.
08
Application
Are important inputs and state transitions validated in trusted server-side logic?
Browser validation can be bypassed by direct requests.
09
Supply chain
Are known dependency vulnerabilities reviewed and production packages intentionally pinned?
Generated apps still inherit package vulnerabilities and update risk.
10
Information
Do failures avoid leaking stack traces, SQL, internal paths, tokens, and customer information?
Error paths commonly disclose implementation details.
11
Abuse
Are expensive, public, or sensitive actions protected against automation and excessive use?
Authentication alone does not prevent account-based abuse or cost spikes.
12
Response
Is there a named security contact and a tested revoke, rotate, disable, and notify path?
The first minutes of an incident should not be spent finding ownership.
Focused guidance
Automated scans help. Runtime boundaries still need evidence.
Lovable provides Basic and Deep scans, but explicitly says they do not replace a thorough review.
Use two synthetic customers to test what policy text and happy paths cannot prove.
Rotation, revocation, disablement, ownership, and notification should not begin after an incident.
A focused self-assessment is not proof, certification, or a substitute for the complete evidence-based inspection.